Essay 72

In general, I agree with the assertion that intense media scrutiny nearly always serves to diminish the reputation of society's would-be heroes, for the chief reason that it seems to be the nature of media to look for ways to demean public figures whether heroic or not. Moreover, while in isolated cases our so-called heroes have vindicated themselves and restored their reputations diminished by the media, in my observation these are exceptional cases to the general rule that once slandered, the reputation of any public figure, hero or otherwise, is forever tarnished.

The chief reason why I generally agree with the statement has to do with the forces that motivate the media in the first place. The media generally consist of profit-seeking entities, whose chief objective is to maximize profits for their shareholders or other owners. Moreover, our corporate culture has sanctioned this objective by codifying it as a fiduciary obligation of any corporate executive. For better or worse, in our society media viewers, readers, and listeners find information about the misfortunes and misdeeds of others, especially heroic public figures, far more compelling than information about their virtues and accomplishments. In short, we love a good scandal. One need look no further than the newsstand, local television news broadcast, or talk show to find ample evidence that this is the case. Thus in order to maximize profits the media are simply giving the public what they demand scrutiny of heroic public figures that serves to diminish their reputation.

A second reason why I fundamentally agree with the statement is that, again for better or worse, intense media scrutiny raises a presumption, at least in the public's collective mind, that their hero is guilty of some sort of character flaw or misdeed. This presumption is understandable. After all, I think any demographic study would show that the vast majority of people relying on mainstream media for their information lack the sort of critical-thinking skills and objectivity to see beyond what the media feeds them, and to render a fair and fully informed judgment about a public figure heroic or otherwise.

A third reason for my agreement with the statement has to do with the longer-term fallout from intense media scrutiny and the presumption discussed above. Once tarnished as a result of intense media scrutiny, a person's reputation is forever besmirched, regardless of the merits or motives of the scrutinizers. Those who disagree with this seemingly cynical viewpoint might cite cases in which public figures whose reputations had been tarnished were ultimately vindicated. For example, certain celebrities have successfully challenged rag sheets such as the National Enquirer in the courts, winning large damage awards for libel. Yet in my observation these are exceptional cases; besides, a damage award is no indication that the public has expunged from its collective memory a perception that the fallen hero is guilty of the alleged character flaw or peccadillo.

In sum, the statement is fundamentally correct. As long as the media are motivated by profit, and as long as the public at large demands stories that serve to discredit, diminish, and destroy reputations, the media will continue to harm whichever unfortunate individuals become their cynosures. And the opportunity for vindication is little consolation in a society that seems to thrive, and even feed, on watching heroes being knocked off their pedestals.

Essay 73

The speaker asserts that imagination is "sometimes" more valuable than experience because individuals who lack experience can more freely imagine possibilities for approaching tasks than those entrenched in established habits and attitudes. I fundamentally agree; however, as the speaker implies, it is important not to overstate the comparative value of imagination. Examples from the arts and the sciences aptly illustrate both the speaker's point and my caveat.

One need only observe young children as they go about their daily lives to appreciate the role that pure imagination can play as an aid to accomplishing tasks. Young children, by virtue of their lack of experience, can provide insights and valuable approaches to adult problems. Recall the movie Big, in which a young boy magically transformed into an adult found himself in a high-power job as a marketing executive. His inexperience in the adult world of business allowed his youthful imagination free reign to contribute creative and successful ideas that none of his adult colleagues, set in their ways of thinking about how businesses go about maximizing profits, ever would have considered. Admittedly, Big was a fictional account; yet, I think it accurately portrays the extent to which adults lack the kind of imagination that only inexperience can bring to solving many adult problems.

The speaker's contention also finds ample empirical support in certain forms of artistic accomplishment and scientific invention. History is replete with evidence that our most gifted musical composers are young, relatively inexperienced, individuals. Notables ranging from Mozart to McCartney come immediately to mind. Similarly, the wide-eyed wonder of inexperience seems to spur scientific innovation. Consider the science fiction writer Jules Veme, who through pure imagination devised highly specific methods and means for transporting humans to outer space. What makes his imaginings so remarkable is that the actual methods and means for space flight, which engineers settled on through the experience of extensive research and trial-and-error, turned out to be essentially the same ones Verne had imagined nearly a century earlier!

Of course, there are many notable exceptions to the rule that imagination unfettered by experience breeds remarkable insights and accomplishments. Duke Ellington, perhaps jazz music's most prolific composers, continued to create new compositions until late in life.

experience can also play a key role in fact, in literature who registered far more patents with the U.S. patent office than any other person, continued to invent until a very old age. Yet, these are exceptions to the general pattern. Moreover, the later accomplishments of individuals such as these tend to build on earlier ones, and therefore are not as truly inspired as the earlier ones, which sprung from imagination less fettered by life experience.

On the other hand, it is important not to take this assertion about artistic and scientific accomplishment too far. Students of the arts, for instance, must learn theories and techniques, which they then apply to their craft whether music performance, dance, or acting. And, creative writing requires the cognitive ability to understand how language is used and how to communicate ideas. Besides, creative ability is itself partly a function of intellect, that is, creative expression is a marriage of one's cognitive abilities and the expression of one's feelings and emotions. In literature, for example, a rich life experience from which to draw ideas is just as crucial to great achievement as imagination. For example, many critics laud Mark Twam's autobiography, which he wrote on his death bed, as his most inspired work. And, while the direction and goals of scientific research rely on the imaginations of key individuals, most scientific discoveries and inventions come about not by sudden epiphanies of youthful star gazers but rather by years and years of trial-and-error in corporate research laboratories. In sum, imagination can serve as an important catalyst for artistic creativity and scientific invention. Yet, experience can also play a key role; in fact, in literature and in science it can play the sort of imagination that inexperience breeds.

Essay 74

I agree with the statement insofar as our leading voices tend to come from people whose ideas depart from the status quo. However, I do not agree that what motivates these iconoclasts is a mere desire to be different; in my view they are driven primarily by their personal convictions. Supporting examples abound in all areas of human endeavor including politics, the arts, and the physical sciences.

When it comes to political power, I would admit that a deep-seated psychological need to be noticed or to be different sometimes lies at the heart of a person's drive to political power and fame. For instance, some astute presidential historians have described Clinton as a man motivated more by a desire to be great than to accomplish great things. And many psychologists attribute Napoleon's and Mussolini's insatiable lust for power to a so-called "short-man complex" a need to be noticed and admired in spite of one's small physical stature.

Nevertheless, for every leading political voice driven to new ideas by a desire to be noticed or to be different, one can cite many other political leaders clearly driven instead by the courage of their convictions. Iconoclasts Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, for example, secured prominent places in history by challenging the status quo through civil disobedience. Yet no reasonable person could doubt that it was the conviction of their ideas that drove these two leaders to their respective places.

Turning to the arts, mavericks such as Dali, Picasso and Warhol, who departed from established rules of composition, ultimately emerge as the leading artists. And our most influential popular musicians are the ones who are flagrantly "different." Consider, for example, jazz pioneers Thelonius Monk and Miles Davis, who broke all the harmonic rules, or folk musician-poet Bob Dylan, who established a new standard for lyricism. Were all these leading voices driven simply by a desire to be different? Perhaps; but my intuition is that creative urges are born not of ego but rather of some intensely personal commitment to an aesthetic ideal.

As for the physical sciences, innovation and progress can only result from challenging conventional theories-that is, the status quo. Newton and Einstein, for example, both refused to blindly accept what were perceived at their time as certain rules of physics. As a result, both men redefined those rules. Yet it would be patently absurd to assert that these two scientists were driven by a mere desire to conjure up "different" theories than those of their contemporaries or predecessors. Surely it was a conviction that their theories were better that drove these geniuses to their places in history.

To sum up, when one examines history's leading voices it does appear that they typically bring to the world something radically different than the status quo. Yet in most cases this sort of iconoclasm is a by product of personal conviction, not iconoclasm for its own sake.

Essay 75

Is complete honesty a useful virtue in politics? The speaker contends that it is not, for the reason that political leaders must sometimes lie to be effective. In order to evaluate this contention it is necessary to examine the nature of politics, and to distinguish between short-term and long-term effectiveness.

On the one hand are three compelling arguments that a political leader must sometimes be less than truthful in order to be effective in that leadership. The first argument lies in the fact that politics is a game played among politicians-and that to succeed in the game one must use the tools that are part-and-parcel of it. Complete forthrightness is a sign of vulnerability and naivety, neither of which will earn a politician respect among his or her opponents, and which those opponents will use to every advantage against the honest politician.

Secondly, it is crucial to distinguish between misrepresentations of fact in other words, lies and mere political rhetoric. The rhetoric of a successful politician eschews rigorous factual inquiry and indisputable fact while appealing to emotions, ideals, and subjective interpretation and characterizations. Consider, for example, a hypothetical candidate for political office who attacks the incumbent opponent by pointing out only certain portions of that opponent's legislative voting record. The candidate might use a vote against a bill eliminating certain incentives for local businesses as "clear evidence" that the opponent is "anti-business," "bad for the economy," or "out of touch with what voters want." None of these allegations are outright lies; they are simply the rhetorical can't of the effective politician.

Thirdly, politics is a business born not only of idealism but also of pragmatism; after all, in order to be effective a politician must gain and hold onto political power, which means winning elections. In my observation some degree of pandering to the electorate and to those who might lend financial support in re election efforts is necessary to maintain that position. Modern politics is replete with candidates who refused to pander, thereby mining their own chance to exercise effective leadership.

Although in the short term being less-than-truthful with the public might serve a political leader's interest in preserving power, would-be political leaders who lack requisite integrity ultimately forfeit their leadership. Consider Richard Nixon, whose leadership seemed born not of ideology but of personal ambition, which bred contempt of the very people who sanctioned his leadership in the first place; the ultimate result was his forfeiture of that leadership. In contrast, Ronald Reagan was a highly effective leader largely because he honestly, and deeply, believed in the core principles that he espoused and advocated during his presidency and his constituency sensed that genuineness and responded favourably to it. Moreover, certain types of socio-political leadership inherently require the utmost integrity and honesty. Consider notable figures such as Gandhi and King, both of whom were eminently effective in leading others to practice the high ethical and moral standards which they themselves advocated. The reason for this is simple: A high standard for one's own personal integrity is a prerequisite for effective moral leadership.

To sum up, I concede that the game of politics calls for a certain measure of posturing and disingenuousness. Yet, at the end of the game, without a countervailing measure of integrity, political game-playing will serve to diminish a political leader's effectiveness perhaps to the point where the politician forfeits the game.

Essay 76

Are products of human nature such as war and crime actually products of the human condition-specifically, lack of resources and territory? The speaker claims so. I strongly disagree, however. Whether we look at science and history, or simply look around us in our daily lives, we see ample evidence that human aggression is the product of our nature as humans-and not of our circumstances.

First of all, the claim runs contrary to my personal observation about individual behaviour especially when it comes to males. One needs look no further than the local school-ground or kindergarten playroom to see the roots of crime and war. Every school-yard has its bully who delights in tormenting meeker school mates; and in every kindergarten classroom there is at least one miscreant whose habit is to snatch away the favourite toys of classmates purely for the enjoyment of having seized property from another. And these behaviours are clearly not for want of resources or territory. Thus the only reasonable explanation is that they are products of human nature not of the human condition.

Secondly, the claim flies in face of what scientists have learned about genetically determined human traits. Many human traits not just physical ones but psychological ones as well are predetermined at birth. And to a great extent we have inherited our genetic predisposition from our non-human ancestors. One might argue that lower animal species engage in warlike behaviour for the main reason that they must do so to protect their territory, their clan, or for food not because of their nature. Yet, this point begs the question; for we humans have been genetically programmed, through the evolutionary process, to behave in similar ways. In other words, doing so is simply our nature.

Thirdly, the claim makes little sense in the context of human history. Prior to the last few centuries the inhabitable regions of our planet provided ample territory and resources such as food and cultivable land to accommodate every human inhabitant. Yet our distant ancestors engaged in war and crime anyway. What else explains this, except that it is part of our inherent nature to engage in aggressive behaviour toward other humans? Moreover, if we consider the various experiments with Marx's Communism, it becomes clear that the pure Marxist State in which all territory and resources are shared according to the needs of each individual does not work in practice. Every attempt, whether on the macro- or micro-level, has failed at the hands of a few demagogues or despots, who aggress and oppress like playground bullies.

In sum, the author of this statement misunderstands the roots of such phenomena as war and crime. The statement runs contrary to my personal observations of human behavior, to the scientific notions of genetic predisposition and evolution of species, and to the overwhelming lack of evidence that providing ample resources to people solves these problems.

Essay 77

The speaker's assertion that works in any field can be judged only by experts in that field amounts to an unfair generalization, in my view. I would concur with the speaker when it comes to judging the work of social scientists, although I would strongly disagree when it comes to work in the pure physical sciences, as explained in the following discussion.

With respect to the social sciences, the social world presents a seamless web of not only anthropogenic but also physical forces, which interact in ways that can be understood only in the context of a variety of disciplines. Thus experts from various fields must collectively determine the merit of work in the social sciences. For example, consider the field of cultural anthropology. The merits of researcher's findings and conclusions about an ancient civilization must be scrutinized by biochemists, geologists, linguists, and even astronomers.

Specifically, by analysing the hair, nails, blood and bones of mummified bodies, biochemists and forensic scientists can pass judgment on the anthropologist's conjectures about the life expectancy, general well-being, and common causes of death of the population. Geologists are needed to identify the source and age of the materials used for tools, weapons, and structures thereby determining whether the anthropologist extrapolated correctly about the civilization's economy, trades and work habits, life styles, extent of travel and mobility, and so forth. Linguists are needed to interpret hieroglyphics and extrapolate from found fragments of writings. And astronomers are sometimes needed to determine with the anthropologist's explanations for the layout of an ancient city or the design, structure and position of monuments, tombs, and temples is convincing-because ancients often looked to the stars for guidance in building cities and structures.

In contrast, the work of researchers in the purely physical sciences can be judged only by their peers. The reason for this is that scientific theories and observations are either meritorious or not, depending solely on whether they can be proved or disproved by way of the scientific method. For example, consider the complex equations which physicists rely upon to draw conclusions about the nature of matter, time, and space, or the origins and future of the universe. Only other physicists in these specialties can understand, let alone judge, this type of theoretical work. Similarly, empirical observations in astrophysics and molecular physics require extremely sophisticated equipment and processes, which only experts in these fields have access to and who know how to use reliably.

Those who disagree that only inside experts can judge scientific work might point out that the expertise of economists and pubic-policy makers is required to determine whether the work is worthwhile from a more mundane economic or political viewpoint. Detractors might also point out that ultimately it is our philosophers who are best equipped to judge the ultimate import of ostensibly profound scientific discoveries. Yet these detractors miss the point of what I take to be the speaker's more narrow claim: that the integrity and quality of work disregarding its socio-economic utility can be judged only by experts in the work's field.

In sum, in the social sciences no area of inquiry operates in a vacuum. Because fields such as anthropology, sociology, and history are so closely intertwined and even dependent on the physical sciences, experts from various fields must collectively determine the integrity and quality of work in these fields. However, in the purely physical sciences the quality and integrity of work can be adequately judged only by inside experts, who are the only ones equipped with sufficient technical knowledge to pass judgment.

Essay 78

Should politics and morality be treated as though they are mutually exclusive? I strongly agree with the speaker that any person claiming so fails to understand either the one or the other. An overly narrow definition of morality might require complete forthrightness and candidness in dealings with others. However, the morality of public politics embraces far broader concerns involving the welfare of society, and recognizes compromise as a necessary, and legitimate, means of addressing those concerns.

It is wrong-headed to equate moral behaviour in politics with the simple notions of honesty and putting the other fellow's needs ahead of one's owner other ways which we typically measure the morality of an individual's private behaviour. Public politics is a game played among professional politicians and to succeed in the game one must use the tools that are part-and-parcel of it. Complete forthrightness is a sign of vulnerability and naivety, neither of which will earn a politician respect among his or her opponents, and which opponents will use to every advantage against the honest politician. Moreover, the rhetoric of a successful politician eschews rigorous factually inquiry and indisputable fact while appealing to emotions, ideals, and subjective interpretation and characterizations. For example, the politician who claims his opponent is "anti-business," "bad for the economy," or "out of touch with what voters want" is not necessarily behaving immorally. We must understand that this sort of rhetoric is part-and-parcel of public politics, and thus kept in perspective does not harm the society-as long as it does not escalate to outright lying.

Those who disagree with the statement also fail to understand that in order to gain the opportunity for moral leadership politicians must engage in certain compromises along the way. Politics is a business born not only of idealism but also of pragmatism insofar as in order to be effective a politician must gain and hold onto political power. In my observation, some degree of pandering to the electorate and to those who might lend financial support for re-election efforts is necessary to maintain that position. Modern politics is replete with candidates who refused to pander, thereby mining their own chance to exercise effective leadership.

Finally, those who claim that effective politicians need not concern themselves with morality fail to appreciate that successful political leadership, if it is to endure, ultimately requires a certain measure of public morality that is, serving the society with its best interests as the leader's overriding concern. Consider the many leaders, such as Stalin and Hitler, whom most people would agree were egregious violators of public morality. Ultimately such leaders forfeit their leadership as a result of the immoral means by which they obtain or wield their power. Or consider less egregious examples such as President Nixon, whose contempt for the very legal system that afforded him his leadership led to his forfeiture of that leadership. It seems to me that in the short term amoral or immoral public behaviour might serve a political leader's interest in preserving power; yet in the long term such behaviour invariably results in that leader's downfall.

In sum, I fundamentally agree with the statement. It recognizes that the "game" of politics calls for a certain amount of disingenuousness that we might associate with dubious private morality. And it recognizes that such behaviour is a necessary means to the final objective of moral political leadership. Besides, at the end of the political game any politician failing to exercise moral leadership ultimately forfeits the game.

Essay 79

The speaker claims that great advances in knowledge necessarily involve rejection of authority. To the extent that political authority impedes such advances, I agree with this claim. Otherwise, in my view most advances in knowledge actually embrace certain forms of authority, rather than rejecting authority out of hand.

One striking example of how political authority can impede the advancement of knowledge involves what we know about the age and evolution of planet Earth. In earlier centuries the official Church of England called for a literal interpretation of the Bible, according to which the Earth's age is determined to be about 6,000 years. If Western thinkers had continued to yield to the ostensible authority of the Church, the fields of structural and historical geology would never have advanced beyond the blind acceptance of this contention as fact.

A more modern example of how yielding to political authority can impede the advancement of knowledge involves the Soviet Refusenik movement of the 1920s. During this time period the Soviet government attempted not only to control the direction and the goals of its scientists' research but also to distort the outcome of that research. During the 1920s the Soviet government quashed certain areas of scientific inquiry, destroyed entire research facilities and libraries, and caused the sudden disappearance of many scientists who were engaged in research that the state viewed as a potential threat to its power and authority. Not surprisingly, during this time period no significant advances in scientific knowledge occurred under the auspices of the Soviet government.

However, given a political climate that facilitates free thought and honest intellectual inquiry, great advances in knowledge can be made by actually embracing certain forms of "authority."

A good example involves modern computer technology. Only by building on, or embracing, certain well-established laws of physics were engineers able to develop silicon-based semi-conductor technology. Although new biotechnology research suggests that organic, biochemical processors will replace artificial semi-conductors as the computers of the future, it would be inappropriate to characterize this leap in knowledge as a rejection of authority.

In sum, to the extent that political authority imposes artificial constraints on knowledge, I agree that advances in knowledge might require rejection of authority. Otherwise, in my observation advances in knowledge more typically embrace and build on authoritative scientific principles and laws, and do not require the rejection of any type of authority.

Essay 80

The speaker claims that great advances in knowledge necessarily involve rejection of authority. To the extent that political authority impedes such advances, I agree with this claim. Otherwise, in my view most advances in knowledge actually embrace certain forms of authority, rather than rejecting authority out of hand.

One striking example of how political authority can impede the advancement of knowledge involves what we know about the age and evolution of planet Earth. In earlier centuries the official Church of England called for a literal interpretation of the Bible, according to which the Earth's age is determined to be about 6,000 years. If Western thinkers had continued to yield to the ostensible authority of the Church, the fields of structural and historical geology would never have advanced beyond the blind acceptance of this contention as fact.

A more modern example of how yielding to political authority can impede the advancement of knowledge involves the Soviet Refusenik movement of the 1920s. During this time period the Soviet government attempted not only to control the direction and the goals of its scientists' research but also to distort the outcome of that research. During the 1920s the Soviet government quashed certain areas of scientific inquiry, destroyed entire research facilities and libraries, and caused the sudden disappearance of many scientists who were engaged in research that the state viewed as a potential threat to its power and authority. Not surprisingly, during this time period no significant advances in scientific knowledge occurred under the auspices of the Soviet government. However, given a political climate that facilitates free thought and honest intellectual inquiry, great advances in knowledge can be made by actually embracing certain forms of "authority."

A good example involves modern computer technology. Only by building on, or embracing, certain well-established laws of physics were engineers able to develop silicon-based semi-conductor technology. Although new biotechnology research suggests that organic, biochemical processors will replace artificial semi-conductors as the computers of the future, it would be inappropriate to characterize this leap in knowledge as a rejection of authority.

In sum, to the extent that political authority imposes artificial constraints on knowledge, I agree that advances in knowledge might require rejection of authority. Otherwise, in my observation advances in knowledge more typically embrace and build on authoritative scientific principles and laws, and do not require the rejection of any type of authority.